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Abstract: This paper shows how to reconcile epistemic invariantism 
with the knowledge account of assertion. My basic proposal is that 
we can comfortably combine invariantism with the knowledge ac-
count of assertion by endorsing contextualism about speech acts. 
My demonstration takes place against the backdrop of recent con-
textualist  attempts  to  usurp the  knowledge  account  of  assertion, 
most notably Keith DeRose’s influential argument that the know-
ledge account of assertion spells doom for invariantism and enables 
contextualism’s  ascendancy.  The paper’s  plan:  Section 1  explains 
contextualism and invariantism. Section 2 recounts a common in-
fluential objection to contextualism, to wit, that its proponents con-
fuse warranted assertability with truth. Section 3 reviews DeRose’s 
response to this objection, wherein he argues that contextualism’s 
opponent, in leveling this objection, is hoist with his own petard. 
Sections 4 – 6 develop resources for crafting a version of invariant-
ism that escapes DeRose’s argument. Section 7 introduces us to this 
freshly equipped version of invariantism, which can be wedded to 
the knowledge account of assertion. Sections 8 – 11 entertain and 
respond to objections. Section 12 concludes our discussion by sug-
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gesting how our new invariantist could respond to the radical skep-
tic, in a way that rivals the anti-skeptical contextualist’s response.
1. Contextualism and Invariantism
Attributer contextualism in epistemology, hereafter just contextu-
alism, is the view that the truth-conditions of knowledge ascrip-
tions, such as ‘S knows that P’, are context-sensitive. In particular, 
knowledge ascriptions are context-sensitive in virtue of ‘knows’ be-
ing  context-sensitive.1 The  attributer’s  context  determines  how 
strong an epistemic position S must be in with respect to P in order 
for ‘S knows that P’  to express a truth in the attributer’s mouth. 
Thus an attributer in one context could truly say ‘S knows that P’, 
while simultaneously an attributer in a different context could refer 
to the same person at the same time with respect to the same pro-
position,  and truly  say  ‘S  does not  know that  P’.  Invariantism 
denies that the truth-conditions of knowledge ascriptions are con-
text-sensitive. They remain constant, invariantists say, across con-
texts.
Why think contextualism is true? First, it provides a principled 
and subtle response to the skeptic, vindicating commonsense intu-
itions that we know many things, while also giving the skeptic her 
1 Cohen (1988, 97), for example, says ‘knows’ is an indexical—in the 
Kaplanian sense of having an invariant character that is a function 
from contexts to content—which predicates different properties in 
different contexts, just as ‘I’ denotes different individuals in different 
contexts. See also Schaffer 2004. All of this, of course, pertains only to 
‘knows’ as it appears in propositional knowledge ascriptions.
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due by explaining skepticism’s  appeal  and the extent to  which it 
gets things right (DeRose 1995, Cohen 2005). Some think this con-
cedes too much to skepticism. They think that we should explain 
skepticism’s  initial  plausibility  only,  but  this  need  not—indeed, 
ought not—involve  conceding that skepticism is at  all  true (Sosa 
1999, 147; Conee 2005, 54 – 5). I do not aim to resolve this dispute 
here, although the paper’s final section presents a positive proposal 
that would complement this criticism of contextualism.
Second, there are imaginary yet entirely realistic conversations 
wherein the protagonist says ‘I know that P’ in an ordinary “low-
stakes” setting, and it seems that he says something true; yet we can 
pair this with a “high-stakes” setting wherein something important 
rests on whether P, the participants take seriously ways in which P 
might turn out to be false despite the evidence at  hand,  and the 
protagonist not only demurs on the question whether he knows that 
P, but we also intuit that it would be  false were he to say ‘I know 
that P’. DeRose’s (1992, 913) pair of bank cases is probably the most 
famous example of this phenomenon. (See also Cohen’s (1999, 58) 
airport cases.) Contextualists claim that such pairs provide excellent 
support for their view. For the apparent truth of knowledge ascrip-
tions varies in response to a change in context. The stakes rise, al-
ternative  possibilities  are  seriously  considered,  and  the  intuition 
that it would be incorrect for the protagonist to self-ascribe know-
ledge becomes strong. That, contextualists will say, is because we 
are implicitly sensitive to the way context affects the truth-condi-
tions of knowledge ascriptions.
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2. The Generality Objection
We  encounter  a  popular  objection  to  this  last  line  of  reasoning 
offered in  support  of  contextualism,  what  DeRose (2002)  calls  a 
“warranted assertability maneuver” or “WAM” for short. A 
WAMmer objects that the contextualist confuses warranted assert-
ability with truth. It is appropriate in the low-stakes setting for our 
protagonist to assert that he knows P, but inappropriate in the high-
stakes setting for him to assert the same. In the high-stakes case it 
might even be appropriate for him to falsely assert that he does not 
know P,  because this  might  be  the only  way to avoid  generating 
false or misleading implications that could have significant negative 
consequences if acted upon.
DeRose thinks there is something to this, but we must carefully 
formulate the insight to properly assess its significance. Indiscrim-
inate WAMming will lead to some ugly results, for we could use the 
strategy to defend even the most implausible of theories. As DeRose 
puts  it,  “Whenever  your  theory  seems to  be  wrong  because  it  is 
omitting a certain truth-condition . . . you can simply claim that as-
sertions of the sentences in question generate implicatures to the 
effect  that  the  condition  in  question holds”  (DeRose 2002,  173). 
Consider this view: S knows that P just in case S believes that P. Of 
course it seems false to say ‘S knows that P’ when S has a false un-
justified belief that P, but that is only because saying ‘S knows that 
P’ generates the (in this case) false implicature that S's belief is true 
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and justified!2
WAMming will  persuade only when it  invokes general rather 
than special one-off conversational rules that generate the relevant 
implicatures. Does the WAM criticism of contextualism display this 
feature?
DeRose thinks it can (although ultimately the necessary refine-
ments  play  right  into  the  contextualist's  hands—more  on  that 
shortly). Here is the basic idea. It is a general conversational rule 
that you ought to assert something only if you are well enough posi-
tioned  epistemically  to assert  it  in the context.  Not only does the 
(warranted) assertability  of ‘I  know that P’  shift  with context,  so 
does that of the unadorned ‘P’. Yet on most substitutions for ‘P’ (for 
example, ‘the bank is open Saturdays’ or ‘the door is locked’) we are 
not tempted to think that its truth-conditions shift with context. But 
this bodes ill for contextualism. We can no longer motivate contex-
tualism by a need to explain what changes from the low- to high-
stakes case, because we can explain that just by noting that the as-
sertability conditions for ‘P’ change, and ‘I know that P’ straightfor-
wardly entails ‘P’, so obviously the assertability conditions for the 
latter will change as well.3 We need not posit shifting truth-condi-
tions for knowledge ascriptions when an explanation predicated on 
general conversational rules suffices. DeRose calls this the Gener-
ality Objection and he honestly acknowledges its force.
2 See the entertaining tale of Jank Fraction in DeRose 2002, section 
1.3.
3 See Hazlett forthcoming for an argument that ‘I know that P’ does 
not entail ‘P’.
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3. A “Lethal” Response
But DeRose also has an ingenious response, which we might encap-
sulate as follows. First recall that the Generality Objection itself is 
predicated on the observation that assertability is context-sensitive. 
Next let’s give some content to the vague formulation of the conver-
sational rule, essential to the Generality Objection, enjoining us to 
assert that P only if we are “well enough positioned” relative to P. 
What is well enough positioned? Answer: knowing. DeRose identi-
fies the relevant norm as: “one is positioned well enough to assert 
that  P  iff  one knows that  P”  (DeRose 2002,  180).4 Call  this  the 
knowledge account of assertion. I shall grant this for the sake 
of argument. But notice now how close the invariantist has come to 
sealing his own fate.
From here it is virtually no leap at all to the conclusion that the 
truth-conditions for knowledge ascriptions shift with context.  Put 
simply, given that
(1) S knows that P iff S is well enough positioned to assert 
that P, and
(2) whether S is well enough positioned to assert that P shifts 
with context,
it follows that,
(3) the truth-conditions for ‘S knows that P’ shift with con-
text.
4 See also Williamson 2000, chapter 11, and Hawthorne 2004, chapter 
1.3. Not all theorists sympathetic to DeRose agree that knowledge is 
necessary and sufficient to be well enough positioned. 
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And 3 just  is  the contextualist thesis.  Earlier I  said that the infer-
ence involves “virtually” no leap because one might suspect it in-
volves some illicit disquotation.5 But I will ignore any such sugges-
tion and grant that the argument is valid, or in any case initially 
quite compelling.
DeRose concludes, “Given how secure is the premise that as-
sertability is context-variable, the knowledge account of assertion, 
which provides the only other premise needed to establish contex-
tualism, is lethal to invariantism” (DeRose 2002, 188).6
But is it indeed lethal? I think not.  Invariantists have the re-
sources to explain all the data and retain the knowledge account of 
assertion without conceding that assertability is context-sensitive, 
that is, without accepting premise 2 of DeRose’s argument.7 In or-
5 Thomas Blackson (2004) argues that it is invalid for a different reason; 
see note 7 for more detail.
6 My exposition in this section inevitably overlooks some subtleties of 
DeRose’s detailed critical treatment of the Generality Objection and 
his positive argument for contextualism via the knowledge account 
of assertion. Nevertheless, I believe it neatly and succinctly captures 
the basic idea in way that promotes the present paper’s main goal.
7 My response thus  differs  fundamentally  from Blackson’s  (2004)  re-
sponse. Blackson responds that DeRose’s argument (what I repres-
ent above as 1 – 3) is invalid because it ignores possible versions of 
invariantism, especially what is  known in the literature variously as 
“sensitive moderate invariantism” (Hawthorne 2004, chapter 4), “in-
terest-relative invariantism” (Stanley 2005, chapter 5), and “subject 
sensitive invariantism” (DeRose 2004). (See also Fantl and McGrath 
2002 and 2007.) By contrast I  respond by challenging the truth of 
one of DeRose’s premises. It’s worth having both responses at our 
disposal.
 Whereas contextualists say that features of the attributor’s con-
text  affect  the  truth-conditions  of  knowledge  ascriptions,  subject 
sensitive invariantists say that knowledge itself is essentially affected 
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der to demonstrate this, I must first set in place some concepts and 
distinctions. The next three sections accomplish this.
4. Speech Acts and Company
When you string together words in a way that satisfies the semantic 
and  grammatical  conventions  of  a  particular  language,  you  say 
something meaningful  in that language.  The act  of  saying some-
thing meaningful in a language is a linguistic act.
In performing a linguistic act, we often do further things. In ut-
tering ‘I promise to come to your party’ I promise to come to your 
party. In uttering ‘It starts at eight’ you assert that it starts at eight. 
In uttering ‘I apologize for forgetting about your party’ I apologize 
for forgetting about your party.  A speech act is that which you do 
in performing a linguistic act. Promising, asserting, and apologizing 
are all speech acts.
The  same  linguistic  act  could  be  used  to  perform  different 
by the subject’s practical situation, and attempt to explain all  the 
relevant data on that basis. It is controversial that purely practical 
matters, such as how much is at stake for the subject, are essentially 
connected with how much the subject knows. Subject sensitive in-
variantism also faces problems with mixed knowledge-attributions in-
volving  subjects  in  very  different  practical  situations,  as  DeRose 
(2004) and Schaffer (2006) argue, and as Hawthorne (2004, 180 n.44) 
himself recognizes.
The view I suggest in this paper is consistent with, but does not 
presuppose, subject sensitive invariantism. It remains to be confron-
ted even by those contextualists who, like DeRose and Schaffer, re-
ject subject sensitive invariantism.
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speech acts, depending on the context. Consider:8
I.
A: Have you been to Boston before?
B: Yes.
II.
A: Do you promise that you’ll come to my party?
B: Yes.
III.
A: Do you swear to abide by the laws of Canada?
B: Yes.
IV.
A: Do you apologize for your rude behavior?
B: Yes.
V.
A: Do you recant your testimony?
B: Yes.
In performing the linguistic act of uttering ‘yes’ in cases I – V,  B 
variously asserts,  promises, swears, apologizes, and recants.  Con-
sider also:9
VI. 
A: Come on, make a prediction.
B: You will not speak in class today.
VII.
A: What is your order?
B: You will not speak in class today.
In performing the linguistic act of uttering ‘You will not speak in 
8 Compare Fogelin and Sinnott-Armstrong 1997, 10.
9 Compare Unger 1975, 266.
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class today’, B makes a prediction in case VI but issues an order in 
VII. (This would be true even if the two token utterances were ex-
actly similar in terms of enunciation, tone, inflection, tempo, etc.) 
In all of these cases, the context of utterance helps determine which 
speech act is performed.
Assertion is the default value of a declarative utterance in Eng-
lish and,  I  presume, other natural  languages as  well  (Williamson 
2000,  258).  Its  default  status  means  that  normally  declarations 
count as assertions and no more—that is, normally in uttering the 
declarative sentence ‘Q’, you assert that Q. But context can affect 
this. For instance in a court of law you may be asked to take an oath 
of testimony. You may be asked to swear to the truth of what you 
are about to say. Having sworn to the truth of your impending testi-
mony, in uttering ‘Q’ you are swearing that Q. Should you utter ‘The 
defendant entered the building before dusk’, you thereby swear that 
the defendant entered the building before dusk.10
Let  speech act contextualism be the view that context af-
fects which speech act you perform in performing a linguistic act.11
10 Consistent with this, you might still assert too. It might even be that 
you swear by asserting.
11 Speech  act  contextualism  differs  from  Cappelen  and  Lepore’s 
(2005) “Speech Act Pluralism.” Speech act pluralism is a view about 
what is asserted by an utterance. They summarize their view like so: 
“No one thing is said (or asserted, or claimed, or . . .) by any utter-
ance:  rather,  indefinitely  many  propositions  are  said,  asserted, 
claimed, stated. What is said (asserted, claimed, etc.) depends on a 
wide  range  of  facts  other  than  the  proposition  semantically  ex-
pressed. It depends on a potentially indefinite number of features of 
the context of utterance and of the context of those who report on 
(or think about) what was said by the utterance.” Cappelen and 
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We  perform  speech  acts  in  order  to  accomplish  things.  We 
rarely perform a speech act for its own sake. I assert that this bottle 
of water contains a lethal amount of arsenic in order to  make you 
aware that it contains a lethal amount of arsenic; if all goes well, I 
make you aware by telling you. I beg you not to drink the liquid in 
order to persuade you not to; if all goes well, I persuade you by beg-
ging you.  A  conversational act is the act of affecting your con-
versational partner by performing a speech act in a conversation. In 
the first example above, the speech act is assertion and the conver-
sational act is  making aware or  alerting.  In the second example, 
the speech act is begging and the conversational act is persuasion.
We perform a conversational act by performing a speech act, 
but the two are distinct. Consider what would happen if you weren’t 
paying attention to me when I asserted that the bottle contains a 
lethal amount of arsenic: I would still have made the assertion, but I 
would not have made you aware of the relevant fact. My making you 
aware requires your cooperation, which may or may not be forth-
coming.12
Lepore 2005, 4; see also 199ff.
12 The general picture of language sketched in this section derives ulti-
mately  from Austin  1962,  through the lens  of  Fogelin  and Sinnott-
Armstrong 1997, chapter 1. Following Fogelin and Sinnott-Armstrong, 
what Austin calls a “locutionary act” I call a “linguistic act,” what 
Austin calls an “illocutionary act” I call a “speech act,” and what 
Austin calls a “perlocutionary act” I call a “conversational act.” See 
Austin 1962, esp. 102 – 3, 108.
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5. Truth, Credibility and Requirements
Other things equal, insofar as an assertion is true, it is good qua as-
sertion; insofar as an assertion is false, it is bad qua assertion.13 Of 
course the consequences of asserting the truth on some occasion 
may be bad, so it might be bad all things considered to assert that 
particular truth at that particular time. Likewise the consequences 
of asserting the false on some occasion may be good, so it might be 
good all things considered to assert that particular falsehood at that 
particular time. But this should not obscure the original point that, 
other things equal, asserting the true is good and asserting the false 
bad. For convenience we might summarize this by saying truth gov-
erns assertion or assertion aims at truth. I adopt the latter.
Other  speech  acts  aim  at  truth.  Consider  conjecture.  Other 
things equal, insofar as a conjecture is true, it is good qua conjec-
ture; insofar as it is false, it is bad qua conjecture. The same quali-
fications that held for assertion also hold for conjecture: a false con-
jecture might be good all things considered, and a true conjecture 
bad all things considered. Analogous points apply to the speech acts 
of  guessing,  guaranteeing,  and swearing.  Let’s  call  this  family  of 
speech acts that aim at truth alethic speech acts.
We can make finer distinctions if  we like.  Let ‘Ф’ range over 
13 Williamson (2000, 244 ff) makes many of the points enumerated in 
this section, though for a different purpose. Williamson aims to dis-
credit the truth account of assertion, according to which ‘One must: 
assert p only if p is true’ is the constitutive rule of assertion. Williamson 
favors the knowledge account, according to which ‘One must: as-
sert p only if one knows p’ is the constitutive rule of assertion.
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alethic speech acts. For at least many Ф, and at least some adverbs, 
we can also adverbially-Ф. For example, you can swear and then 
you can solemnly swear; you can assert and then you can confid-
ently or qualifiedly assert. For present purposes we needn’t decide 
whether  to  count  adverbially-Фing  as  a  distinct  speech  act  from 
Фing.
Asserting that Q places more of your credibility on the line than 
conjecturing that Q. Swearing that Q places more of your credibility 
on the line than merely asserting that Q. Let’s call the amount of 
credibility you place on the line by making an alethic speech act its 
credibility requirement.  Even if adverbially-Фing doesn’t count 
as a distinct speech act from  Фing,  adverbial  qualification affects 
the  amount  of  credibility  required.  Confidently  conjecturing  ex-
tracts more credibility than just plain conjecturing. Confidently as-
serting extracts more credibility than just plain asserting, and the 
latter more than making a hedged assertion. Solemnly swearing ex-
tracts more credibility than just plain swearing. Absolutely guaran-
teeing extracts more credibility than just plain guaranteeing.
Competent  speakers  can  intuitively  sort  credibility  require-
ments along a spectrum. Call the resulting ordering the credibility 
index for alethic speech acts. The lesser a speech act’s credibility re-
quirement, the lower it ranks on the index; the greater the require-
ment, the higher it ranks. Guessing ranks lower than conjecturing, 
conjecturing lower than assertion, and assertion lower than swear-
ing. Someone who sincerely believed that conjecturing ranked high-
er than asserting would thereby demonstrate some measure of lin-
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guistic incompetence. But linguistic conventions are not rigorous or 
explicit  enough  to  produce  a  perfectly  well-ordered  index,  or  to 
compel complete agreement among even fully competent speakers. 
For example, it is not entirely clear whether swearing or guarantee-
ing ranks higher. If I judge swearing to rank higher, others may sin-
cerely disagree without thereby demonstrating linguistic incompet-
ence. Neither does the index precisely rank adverbial modification 
of one speech act relative to another. Conjecture ranks lower than 
assertion, but does confidently conjecturing rank lower than quali-
fiedly asserting? It is not clear. Present purposes permit us to leave 
the matter unsettled.
The higher an alethic speech act ranks on the credibility index, 
the stricter the epistemic norms that govern it. In other words, the 
greater the credibility requirement, the greater the corresponding 
epistemic requirement. Corresponding to the credibility index, 
then, is an epistemic index for alethic speech acts. Guessing has the 
most relaxed epistemic requirement of all these. Let a  pure blind 
guess be a guess where your total evidence is indifferent among any 
and all relevant options. Pure blind guessing extracts no credibility 
and so carries no epistemic requirement. You are required, at most, 
only to not guess against your evidence.14 Conjecturing has stricter 
epistemic requirements than guessing.  Asserting has  stricter  epi-
stemic requirements than conjecturing. Swearing and guaranteeing 
14 Suppose you’re asked to guess whether Q or R. If your evidence on 
balance indicates that one of the options is more likely, then you 
ought to guess that option, and if you guess otherwise, then the 
resulting guess would to that extent be bad.
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have stricter epistemic requirements than asserting.
A metaphor may help bring this all together. Think of language 
use as a game we continually play in order to achieve our individual 
and collective goals; think of a conversation as a round in the game; 
and think of the various alethic speech acts as possible moves in the 
game. You can play a round with anyone who’s willing to play with 
you. Each person starts the game with a certain amount of currency 
called “credibility,” held in an account with a rolling balance. Mak-
ing a move requires a deposit, known as the move’s “credibility re-
quirement,” the amount of which is listed in the “credibility index” 
of the game’s instruction manual. Guessing is free; conjecturing is 
cheap; asserting is neither cheap nor expensive; guaranteeing and 
swearing are expensive. When you move, the house extracts a de-
posit  from your  credibility  account  and holds  it  in  escrow.  Once 
your move is complete, the house refunds your deposit only if (or, 
perhaps, to the extent that) you met certain predefined standards, 
known  as  the  move’s  “epistemic  requirement,”  detailed  in  the 
manual’s “epistemic index.” If you did not meet the epistemic re-
quirements when you made your move, you lose your deposit; if you 
did, you recover your deposit, often times with interest.
6. Relative Ranking
The relative ranking of alethic speech acts in the credibility and epi-
stemic indices is clear enough. We should not expect precision in 
specifying absolute epistemic requirements. Short of technical stip-
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ulation—and even with  a  moderate  dose  of  that—a plausible  ap-
proximate qualitative specification is the most we can reasonably 
hope for. 
To aid our discussion, I shall adopt and leave undefined the in-
tuitive idiom of  probability on your evidence, and I shall assume 
that knowledge requires a probability of 1 on your evidence. Let me 
emphasize that nothing in my discussion essentially depends upon 
either the aid or the assumption: I employ them purely for conveni-
ence.  The  knowledge  account  of  assertion  will  provide  a  helpful 
benchmark to guide our discussion.
The epistemic requirement for assertion is knowledge. The re-
quirement  for  guessing  or  conjecturing  is  something  less  than 
knowledge. The requirement for swearing or guaranteeing is some-
thing greater than knowledge.15 Assuming that knowledge requires 
a probability of 1 on your evidence, you are well-enough positioned 
to assert that Q if and only if Q has a probability of 1 on your evid-
ence.
If knowledge requires a probability of 1 on your evidence, what 
more is required for guaranteeing? It cannot be a probability great-
15 A referee finds it implausible that there are “augmented epistemic 
states above knowing.” I find that things seem otherwise to me, for 
at least three reasons. First, one person can know something better 
than another, so there exist grades of knowledge beyond the bare 
minimum required to know. Second, knowing that you know consti-
tutes a greater epistemic achievement than merely knowing. Third, 
understanding why Q requires  not  only  knowing that  Q,  but  also 
knowing what  explains  Q.  Knowing full  well,  knowledge of  know-
ledge, and understanding are all plausible candidates for “augmen-
ted epistemic states” above mere knowledge.
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er  than 1,  because  1  is  by  definition  probability’s  upper  limit.  A 
range of alternatives suggests itself. Perhaps it is knowing full well 
that Q, where this requires the probability of Q on your evidence to 
be overdetermined at 1. This in turn requires you to have a surfeit 
of evidence for Q, such that were you to lose some of it, and gain no 
further evidence favoring it, the probability of Q on your evidence 
would still be 1. Or perhaps it must be more probable than not on 
your evidence that you know that Q,  or highly  probable on your 
evidence that you know that Q. Or, finally, consider this intuitive 
suggestion.16 The epistemic requirement on guaranteeing is know-
ledge of knowledge: you are well-enough positioned to guarantee 
that Q only if you know that you know that Q. Call this the KK ac-
count of guaranteeing.17 Any of these suggestions will suffice for 
16 Compare Austin 1946, 99 – 100. 
17 The KK account of guaranteeing would provide another reason to 
prize what Ernest Sosa calls “reflective knowledge.” Sosa (2007, 32) 
defines  reflectively  knowing  that  Q  as  having  animal  knowledge 
that you know that Q: “If K represents animal knowledge and K+ re-
flective knowledge, then the basic idea may be represented thus: 
K+q ↔ KKq.” Reflective knowledge figures centrally in Sosa’s import-
ant  and  influential  epistemology.  Yet  elsewhere  Sosa  (2004,  291) 
finds himself forced to grapple with the question: what is so import-
ant  about  this  sort  of  knowledge? We could define another  cat-
egory of knowledge, reflected knowledge, thus: you have reflected 
knowledge that Q if and only if you know that Q and someone else 
knows that you know that Q. (Sosa considers  the alternative cat-
egory of “consultative knowledge,” but reflected knowledge does 
just as well.) So we ask, “Why the pride of place for reflective know-
ledge?”
Sosa is keenly aware of how deeply knowledge is intertwined 
with the social (see, for example, Sosa 1991, 26, 48 – 49, 275 – 276). 
And so, while recognizing the probative force of his response to the 
question just posed, we may offer in a friendly spirit this additional 
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present purposes, though I prefer the KK account.
7. The Invariantist Alternative
We now have the tools to introduce our freshly equipped version of 
invariantism, which can be wedded to the knowledge account of asser-
tion to defuse DeRose’s argument. Here is my pair of toy cases:
The Door Case, low-stakes version (Low Door): Our family is 
taking a short walk to the corner to place a letter in the mailbox, 
which is within plain sight of our front door. We have a policy of 
locking our door when we leave the premises, and we prefer to fol-
low through on our policies. As we reach the end of the driveway on 
our way to the mailbox, my wife asks, “Is the door locked?” I re-
spond, “Yes, it’s locked. I remember turning the key and feeling it 
click.” “Maybe you’re mistaken; you do sometimes make mistakes,” 
she remarks. “It’s locked,” I reply. “All right,” she says.
The Door Case, high-stakes version (High Door): Our family 
has just pulled out of the driveway, on the beginning of a week-long 
vacation to New Hampshire’s White Mountains. We live in a relat-
ively  safe  neighborhood,  but  there  has been a  rash of  burglaries 
lately. As we near the corner of our block, my wife asks, “Is the door 
locked?” I respond, “Yes, it’s locked. I remember turning the key 
suggestion. Reflective knowledge is important because it enables us 
to  engage  in  the  important  social  practice  of  guaranteeing.  (A 
promise is plausibly regarded as a special type of guarantee, per-
haps distinguished by being properly offered only when the promisor 
and promisee are somehow intimate.) Reflective knowledge is the 
norm of guaranteeing. Reflected knowledge is not.
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and feeling it  click.”  My wife reminds me of the recent string of 
burglaries and points out how devastating it would be were we to 
return from our trip only to find our home ransacked and our be-
longings stolen.  She continues,  “It’s  rare, but sometimes the bolt 
hits the strike plate in such a way that it  clicks but doesn't  lock. 
So . . . I ask again: Is it locked?” “I think it’s locked, but I’d better go 
back and check,” I reply. “All right,” she says.
Why am I willing to repeat ‘It’s locked’ upon questioning in Low 
Door  but  not  High  Door?  The contextualist  explanation,  supple-
mented by the knowledge account of assertion,  goes like this.  In 
Low Door, I know throughout that the door is locked, so it is okay to 
reassert that the door is locked. In High Door, I do not know that 
the door is locked after my wife’s speech, so it is not okay to reassert 
that the door is locked. The hedged claim, not the bald one, is ap-
propriate, and I am tacitly sensitive to this, which explains my lin-
guistic behavior.
The  contextualist  explanation  assumes  that  throughout  both 
cases  uttering  ‘It’s  locked’  amounts  to  merely  asserting  that  the 
door is locked. DeRose, for example, thinks that this is obvious. As 
he puts  it,  in uttering ‘P’,  “S (of  course)  asserts that P” (DeRose 
2002,  185).  But  it  is  not obvious.18 Assertion may be the default 
value of a declarative  utterance, but context can alter this,  as we 
18 Some don’t always clearly distinguish uttering ‘P’ from asserting that 
P. But they’re not the same thing. We make assertions  by uttering 
sentences. I recognize that it may ordinarily be acceptable to say 
that one “asserted” a sentence. Nevertheless,  I  believe this to be 
misuse of words, though one I would be reluctant to remark upon, 
save for special circumstances.
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have already seen.
The  invariantist  can  explain  matters  as  follows.  Throughout 
Low Door, uttering ‘It’s locked’ amounts to no more than asserting 
that it is locked. I am in a position to assert that it is locked both be-
fore and after my wife’s speech, so uttering ‘It’s locked’ and thereby 
asserting that it’s locked is appropriate both times. In High Door, 
before  my wife’s  speech,  my uttering ‘It’s  locked’  amounts  to  no 
more than asserting that it is locked, and I am in a position to do 
that because I know that it is locked. But my wife’s speech raises the 
stakes and we shift context. Now uttering ‘It’s locked’ is to perform 
an alethic speech act higher up the credibility and epistemic indices. 
For convenience let’s say it is guaranteeing.19 I am tacitly aware of 
this shift, as well as the fact that I am not in a strong enough posi-
tion to guarantee that the door is locked, so I do not respond with 
‘It’s locked’ but rather ‘I think it’s locked’. I then embark on the task 
of gathering enough extra evidence—double- or maybe even triple-
checking—to position myself to come back and offer her the guaran-
tee by saying ‘Yep, it’s locked’.
Recall  what  explicitly  occurs when you take  an oath of testi-
mony in a court of law. You swear to tell the truth. Now when you 
sincerely utter ‘Q’ you are not merely asserting that Q, but swearing 
that Q. On the view I am suggesting, something like this happens in 
19 Anticipating an understandable objection considered in more detail 
below, let me emphasize that it does not matter whether we call it 
“guaranteeing.” What matters is that, whatever speech act repeat-
ing ‘It’s locked’ would amount to, it would extract more credibility 
than mere assertion.
Invariantism and Speech Act Contextualism 21
High Door when my wife makes it painfully obvious how much is at 
stake and explicitly challenges me to stand by my words. Moreover, 
I am tacitly sensitive to this shift. Surely the contextualist cannot 
plausibly object to this latter aspect of my proposal, as it would be 
exceedingly odd to insist that we could detect a shift when it affects 
truth-conditions, but not when it affects speech acts.
In a word, on my view what shifts is which speech act one per-
forms in uttering a declarative sentence. This is an instance of the 
more general phenomenon of speech act contextualism. The stand-
ards for appropriate assertion and knowledge remain invariant.
Thus the invariantist can accept the knowledge account of as-
sertion  and explain the linguistic data  without accepting that as-
sertability is context-sensitive. Speech act contextualism is the key. 
And by embracing it the invariantist denies DeRose a pathway to 
contextualism through assertion.20
20 A referee asks whether the contextualist and I agree on what the 
data are.  I  believe that we can agree on all  the  uncontroversial 
data, which consist primarily of our estimation of overt linguistic be-
havior in the relevant real and imaginary cases. Is their speech cor-
rect or incorrect? Of course,  the contextualist  and I  will  often dis-
agree over what the correctness or incorrectness consists in. (For ex-
ample, whereas I might say they made an unwarranted guarantee, 
the contextualist would say they made an unwarranted assertion.) 
But that’s a theoretical dispute over how to explain the data, not 
over what the data are. In the present context, I could not properly 
treat as a datum the claim that epistemic standards are invariant 
across contexts. Likewise, the contextualist could not properly treat 
as a datum the claim that epistemic standards “vary with context 
even  in  ordinary,  nonphilosophical  conversations”  (DeRose  1999, 
195; see also DeRose 2002, 169). (Note: DeRose does not treat it as a 
datum in the passage quoted; he deploys it as part of his theory, es-
pecially his treatment of skepticism.)
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8. Why It Counts as Guaranteeing
Doubtless context can affect which speech act you perform with a 
declarative utterance. But why think that it occurs in the way my ac-
count requires?
We perform speech acts for a purpose. In both versions of the 
Door Case, my goal was to assure my wife that the door was locked. 
I sought to assure her by asserting that it was locked. But in High 
Door her speech made it clear that, given what was at stake, mere 
assertion wouldn’t suffice to assure her; I would have to put more 
credibility on the line to accomplish that. This was mutually under-
stood. She also made it clear that she wanted to be assured, other-
wise she wouldn’t be asking the question again. This was also mutu-
ally  understood. In repeating the question,  she challenged me to 
stand by my words, implying that doing so would suffice to assure 
her. But since assuring her would require more than mere asser-
tion, standing by my words must then count as more than mere as-
sertion. It would count as guaranteeing.
9. Scorekeeping
My theory requires that there be something like a “pragmatic force 
of a declarative utterance” component on the conversational score-
card. Is there any empirical evidence for thinking that things work 
this way?21
21 Thanks to Jonathan Schaffer for raising this question.
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Yes. Consider this perfectly realistic example. A witness takes 
the oath of testimony. The prosecutor asks her a question: Did the 
defendant enter the building before dusk? There follows a series of 
questions for clarification and consequent clarifications: Q: Dusk on 
which date? A: October 7, 2007. Q: Which building? A: The opera 
house in Sydney. Etc. Many turns later, the witness utters ‘Yes, the 
defendant entered the building before dusk’. Everyone understands 
this to be sworn testimony that the defendant entered the building 
before dusk. This common understanding is best explained by the 
hypothesis that swearing is recorded on the scorecard as the force 
of the witness’s declarative utterances.
The facts actually require a more subtle explanation than that. 
The scorecard records swearing as the force of the witness’s declar-
ative utterances, when offered in response to questioning by an of-
ficer of the court, when such pertains to material facts of the case at 
hand. Assertion would still be the force of many other potential de-
clarative utterances by the witness. For instance, if she uttered ‘I 
cannot hear you’ or ‘excuse me, I need to use the washroom’, no one 
would understand her to be swearing that she could not hear the 
prosecutor, or that she needed to use the washroom. Nor would she 
count as swearing to those things. Likewise if a heckler stood up 
and shouted ‘Hey, weren’t you on  Jeopardy!  last week?’  and our 
witness replied ‘No,  I  was not’,  no one would understand her as 
swearing that she hadn’t been on Jeopardy! last week. That people 
easily navigate these subtleties suggests that the scorecard carefully 
tracks the pragmatic force of declarative utterances.
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Consider another example. Elaine is planning a party. She an-
nounces  it  over  lunch with  several  of  her  friends  and says ‘Now 
don’t say you’ll come unless you absolutely promise to come’. In re-
sponse, Sally utters ‘I’ll come to your party, Elaine’. This is under-
stood by everyone as a promise to come. This common understand-
ing is best explained by the hypothesis that promising has been re-
corded on the scorecard as the force of a declarative utterance such 
as ‘I’ll come to your party, Elaine’. Had Sally added ‘And I’ll bring 
guacamole’,  it  would  not  have  likewise  counted  as  promising  to 
bring guacamole.
10. Conventional Mechanisms
What’s the mechanism by which we achieve a shift in context?
Convention determines the mechanisms. Imagine a community 
of mute persons who communicate by writing with chalk on small 
blackboards that they carry around with them.22 They have different 
color chalk for different purposes. If one of them, Jones, writes a 
declarative sentence ‘Q’ in yellow chalk on his board and presents it 
to his interlocutor, Smith, then by convention this counts as Jones 
asserting that Q. If Smith chooses, she may hand Jones a piece of 
purple chalk and gesture towards his board. If  Jones accepts the 
chalk and uses it to re-trace ‘Q’ on his board, then by convention 
this counts as Jones guaranteeing that Q. Community members typ-
ically “pass the purple chalk” only if something important is at stake 
22 Just as Louis does in E. B. White’s classic The Trumpet of the Swan.
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and they need special assurance that a bit  of information is reli-
able.23
In our community a speech like my wife’s in High Door is the 
equivalent  of  passing  the  purple  chalk.  Explicitly  challenging 
someone to stand by his words seems to be a common way of relev-
antly affecting the conversational context, an effect often (though 
not always) amplified by emphasizing urgent practical matters. In 
another community it might be eccentrically tying your shoelaces in 
triple knots. In another it might be to slap your interlocutor across 
the lips. The possibilities are limitless.
11. Call It What You Want
What if the contextualist responds by arguing that, on the one hand, 
to guarantee is just to emphatically assert, and on the other, that to 
adverbially-Φ is  not a different speech act  from  Φing? If  correct, 
wouldn’t this ruin my argument?
No. Instead of a qualitative model featuring a spectrum of dif-
ferent types of speech act, we then get a qualitative model featuring 
a spectrum of different grades of a single speech act. The latter ap-
proach would say that context affects how emphatically you assert 
by making a declarative utterance. Emphatically asserting extracts 
more credibility than simply asserting, just as simply asserting ex-
23 James Dreier suggested to me that this sort of example—where writ-
ing something in purple chalk amounts to guaranteeing or promising 
or some such thing—might be originally due to Elizabeth Anscombe. 
I cannot find a reference.
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tracts more credibility than qualifiedly asserting. Consequently, em-
phatic  assertion’s  epistemic  requirement  will  be  greater  than 
(simple)  assertion’s,  which  requirement  is  knowledge.  In  High 
Door, I don’t repeat ‘It’s locked’ because I tacitly recognize that do-
ing so would constitute an emphatic assertion, and that I don’t meet 
the epistemic requirements for emphatic assertion. Etc. We can call 
guaranteeing ‘emphatically  asserting’  if  we like,  but that will  not 
change the basic underlying intuitive facts that inspire the invari-
antist alternative.24
24 A referee suggests that the scale of speech acts might not be as 
fine-grained as the scale of epistemic standards, which in turn might 
disadvantage my view. Standards can vary to any degree we like, 
but the same is not true for speech acts, even when we allow for 
adverbial modification (for example, asserting vs. qualifiedly assert-
ing; swearing vs. solemnly swearing; etc.) This arguably favors con-
textualists  because their  view will  have resources  to respect  “the 
endlessly variegated demands of context” where mine might falter.
It seems to me that my view can well match contextualism’s ver-
satility here, for two reasons. First, adverbial modification enables sig-
nificant versatility,  so  much so that any advantage contextualism 
scores here will be slight indeed.
Second, if the contextualist’s epistemic standards can vary con-
tinuously along a scale, then so can  the amount of credibility ex-
tracted  by  a  declaration vary  endlessly  in  response  to  context. 
Crude  versions  of  epistemic  contextualism  posit  two  senses  of 
‘know’,  or  two epistemic standards,  low and high. But as DeRose 
(1999, 192 – 5) has explained, the most plausible versions of contex-
tualism posit “a wide variety of different standards.” Likewise, crude 
versions of speech act contextualism might hew closely to the qual-
itative and discontinuous scale of alethic speech acts named in or-
dinary language. But  more sophisticated versions might view that 
scale as merely a serviceable practical tool for approximating how 
much credibility a declaration extracts.
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12. An Anti-Skeptical Strategy
This final section indicates how an anti-skeptical invariantist might 
embellish my proposal. I emphasize that this section is more specu-
lative than the rest of the paper, and defending the embellishment 
goes beyond the paper’s main goal.
In ordinary contexts uttering ‘Q’ is to assert that Q, but in high-
stakes contexts uttering ‘Q’ is to guarantee that Q. In ordinary con-
texts uttering ‘I think that Q’ is to make a hedged or qualified asser-
tion, but in high-stakes contexts uttering ‘I think that Q’ might be a 
way to assert  that Q.  This  makes  sense  because  ‘Q’  is  no longer 
available for the job, but nevertheless we might still want or need to 
be able to continue simply asserting things, even when the stakes 
are high. The unadorned ‘Q’ was promoted a level, so it stands to 
reason that ‘I think that Q’ would likewise get promoted to take its 
place.25 For instance, in High Door uttering ‘I think it’s locked’ the 
second time was to assert that it is locked. Moreover, everyone re-
cognizes that, given my evidence, it was appropriate for me to re-
peat ‘I think it’s locked’ in High Door. So assuming that knowledge 
is the norm of assertion, it follows that I continue to know that it is 
locked throughout High Door.
We could generalize this strategy to explain our linguistic beha-
25 In response, one might argue that such a shift needn’t be seamless, 
and thus could result in  speech-act gaps. It does not seem neces-
sary that ‘I think that Q’ would be promoted; maybe asserting that 
Q is simply no longer an option when the conversation reaches that 
point.
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vior in the face of formidable skeptical hypotheses—extending the 
scope and power of our newly fashioned invariantism, stealing yet 
more thunder from the anti-skeptical  contextualist—without con-
ceding anything to the skeptic, aside from cleverness. We might not 
be willing to say ‘I am not a handless brain in a vat’ when confron-
ted with the skeptical hypothesis that we are the unwitting victims 
of a malevolent neuroscientist, mere brains in vats being fed sens-
ory stimuli that make it seem just as though we have hands. But 
even when challenged this way, we still are willing to say ‘I think I 
am not a handless brain in a vat’, which we all recognize as appro-
priate, and which, in the context, amounts to asserting that one is 
not a handless brain in a vat. Assuming that the knowledge account 
of assertion is true, then, it follows that we continue to know that 
we are not handless brains in vats, even in the skeptical context.26
26 Thanks to Keith DeRose, James Dreier,  Leo Iacono, Ben Jarvis,  An-
drew Rotondo, Patrick Rysiew, Jonathan Schaffer, Ernest Sosa and 
Rob Stainton for very helpful conversation, feedback and advice. 
Thanks also to two anonymous referees.
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